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MISTAKE OF LAw-REFORATIoN OF A DEED-INTENTION OF
GRANTOR-RELIEF IN EquiTy.-Atherton et al. v. Roche et al.,

61 N. E. Rep. 357 (Supreme Court of Illinois, October 24,
1901). The point of the decision in this case was that ancient
and often mooted question-will equity relieve against a mistake
of law? As usual there was a difference of opinion and the final
decision was rendered, by four to three, in favor of the negative.
The grantor, by deed, conveyed certain property to his daughter, Margaret Atherton, and her husband, Byron Atherton, and
"their bodily heirs." The deed was a voluntary grant, and the
grantor's intention was to provide equally for all the children
of his daughter Margaret, and he was under the impression that
this would be accomplished by the use of the word their. It was
shown by the evidence that the deed was read to the grantor
before he executed it, and that he discussed the meaning of the
terms and insisted that he knew the legal effect thereof, which,
he contended, would carry out his intention to provide for all
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of his daughter's children. Margaret Atherton, the daughter, had
one child by a previous marriage, and by her marriage with
Byron Atherton she had one more, Homer Atherton,- the defendant. Subsequent to the execution of this deed, Byron Atherton
died, and Margaret Atherton married again, and had three children by this third marriage. This bill was filed to have the
word their in the deed of conveyance changed to her, in order
that all five of the children of Margaret Atherton might share
equally according to the intention of the grantor, instead of
the entire estate passing to the defendant, Homer Atherton, the
only child of her marriage with Byron Atherton.
That it was the intention of the grantor to provide for all of
his daughter's children was clearly proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, and the question for the court to determine was whether
his desire should be made effectual, or whether the technical
word used by him in the deed should be allowed to cause an
entirely different disposition of the property, merely because it
was a mistake of law.
It is admitted that when a mistake of fact has occurred, a
court of equity will grant relief without question, but when the
mistake is one of law there is a grand marshaling of authorities
on both sides, and a battle royal ensues. The majority opinion,
as delivered by Judge Hand, declared that "the mistake complained of is not a mistake as to what words were contained in
the deed, but simply as to the meaning and legal effect of the
word their. This, manifestly, is not a mistake as to any fact,
but purely a mistake of law, and such as equity will not relieve
against." Three members of the court objected to this view of
the law and their dissent is expressed by Judge Boggs on the
ground "that a mistake as to the legal principles which control
the subject-matter of the transaction "annot be corrected; but
mistakes as to the legal meaning and effect of words selected by
the parties in drafting written instrunents to evidence the agreements into which they have entered, though mistakes of law; do
not enter into and become part of the contract, and such instruments may be reformed so as to declare the true intention of
the parties."
In considering this question of mistake of law, it will be necessary to limit the discussion to the law as applied to relief against
the terms of written instruments, and a review of the decisions
would seem to indicate that there are three possible views.
The first holds that, where the parties to the agreement, with
full knowledge of the facts, use terms or language having a
definite legal effect, and that effect is different from their intention, such misuse is a mistake of law which equity will not relieve
against. The second view is merely the converse of the first and
holds that though a mistake of law, equity will grant relief and
reform the ingtrument according to the true intent of the parties.
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The third view is that such a mistake is not a mistake of law in
any sense, but rather a mistake of fact and should be treated as
such by a court of equity.
The first is expressed in the majority opinion and seems to
have been the view taken by the court of, Illinois in a long line
of cases upon the subject, commencing with Sibert v. McAvoy,
15 Ill. 106 (1853) ; and followed by Gordon v. Downing, 18 Ill.
492 (1857) ; Fowler v. Black, 136 Ill. 363 (1891) ; Reymour v.
Bowles, 172 Ill. 521 (1898) ; Butterfield v. Sawyer, 187 II. 598
(1900).
The second view is that held by the minority opinion and is
the view accepted in the majority of the jurisdictions in this
country, and in England-the distinction being made between
a mistake or misunderstanding of a principle of law and a mistake as to the legal meaning and effect of words. This distinction is clearly set forth by Beck, J., in Stafford v. Fetters, 55
Iowa, 484 (1881), where he states that "the mistakes of law
against which equity will not relieve are those which pertain to
the subject-matter .of the agreement, and were inducements
thereto, or consideration therefor, but the rule can have no
application to mistakes in the language used, or in the choice
of a form of instrument, whereby it has an effect different from
the intention of the parties." The position taken by the Supreme
Court of Iowa is in accord with Beardsley v. Knight, 10 Vermont
185 (1838) ; Evants v. Strode, 11 Ohio Rep. 480 (1842) ; Clayton v. Freet, 10 Ohio St. 545 (1860); Burdette v. Simons, 3 J.
J. Marsh (Ky.) 190 (1830) ; Sparks v. Pittman, 51 Miss. 511
(1875) ; Kennedy v. George, 44 N. H. 440; Canedy v. Marcy, 13
Gray, 373 (1859); Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Hudson Iron, Co.,
107 Mass. 290 (1871).
It is generally admitted that where,'by a mistake on the part
of the draftsman, or by an oversight of the parties to the instrument, words have been inserted or terms omitted, contrary to
the intentions of the parties interested, in such cases equity will
step in and make the necessary alteration even though, as some
courts hold, the mistake be a mistake of law. This rule is
adopted even in Illinois: Dinwiddie v.Self, 145 Ill. 290 (1893) ;
Kyner v. Boll, 182 Ill. 171 (1899). But it is submitted that
such insertion or omission is not a mistake of law, but a mistake
of fact, and that is the ground taken by the New York .courts
for granting relief: Gillespie v. Moon, 2 Johns, Oh. 585 (1817) ;
Champlin v. Laytin, 18 Wend. 407 (1837); although they
expressly refuse to relieve against a mistake of law. There is
an excellent argument advanced by Senator Paige in Champlin
v. Laytin, where he dissents from the position taken by the
court-his contention being that the same rule should be applied
to mistakes of law as to mistakes of fact. The New York rule
is affirmed in Pennsylvania by Mr. Justice Sharswood in Huss v.
Marris, 63 Pa. 367 (1869).
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Finally it is submitted that in such cases as this the maidm
juris ignorantia non exausat is altogether inapplicable; that it
should be confined to mistakes in regard to the general principles of the law of the land, and not to private rights; and that
the true interpretation of the law, and a doctrine that would
work justice and equity in every case, is to be found in the
opinion of Goldthwaite, J., in Larkins v. Biddle, 21 Ala. 252
(1852), under facts very similar to these. That was a case where
the terms used in the deed were not sufficient for the purpose of
the grantor, and the court held that equity would reform the
deed so as to express the true intention. And "although the error
occurred through a mistake or ignorance of the law, te error
itself might be more properly considered as a mistake of fact."
It is submitted that in such a case it is the intention -of the
grantor which should be effectuated, and where the words used
in the deed vitiate that intention it is clearly within the power
of a court dispensing equitable relief to reform the deed, in the
same manner as though it were a mistake of fact, in order to
accomplish the result desired by the person making such mistake.
W. C. M.
SURETY AND GUAIAT -NOTICE-Hall's Ex'r v. Farmers'
Bank of Kentucky, Hedges v. Same, Penn v. Same, Graves v.
Same, 65 S. W. Rep. 365. (Court of Appeals of Kentucky,
1901.)
The plaintiff in each of the above cases had attached his
signature to an instrument as follows: "P. T. Pullen, of Georgetown, Ky., contemplating the leasing of the Tompson Mills and
carrying on the milling business, and being in need of capital
with which to buy stock and run the same as it should be run
successfully. Now, in order to aid him, we, W. E. Pullen, George
Carley, George V. Payne, T. T. Hedges, J. M. Penn, James
W. Craig, Buford Hall, whose names are hereto signed, agree
to become his security to an amount not exceeding $10,000 in
the aggregate. After this instrument in writing has been signed
by all of us (ten in number) it may be used by the said P. T.
Pullen in the nature of collateral for a sum or sums not exceeding $10,000" in the aggregate; and we the said signers shall be
bound jointly and severally as sureties upon any note or notes
not exceeding in the aggregate said sum, to which said Pullen
shall sign his name and deposit this as collateral." Armed
with this P. T. Pullen obtained an advance of $10,000 from the
Farmers' Bank, giving his notes for the amount and depositing
the paper as security. No formal notice of this transacticin was
given by the Bank to W. E. Pullen and his co-signers, but it
appeared that all had actual notice within a short time except
one named Gano, who livedin the country. When P. T. Pull,'
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notes fell due he failed to meet them and the bank promptly
demanded the amount of his indebtedness from W. E. Pullen
and the others. Gano was the only man who refused to pay
his proportionate share and in a suit which the Bank instituted
for the amount alleged to be due the court held he was under
no legal liability to pay as under his contract he was entitled
to notice of advances made and-the failure to give him such notice
discharged him. (Gano v. Bank, 45 S. W. 519). After this
decision was handed down, W. E. Pullen and the others brought
separate actions against the Bank to recover the money paid by
them. The court said that owing to the doubt attending the
interpretation of the contract the case presented one of money
paid under mistake of law which could not be recovered, citing
in support Storr v. Barker, 6 John, S., Oh. 169; Underwood v.
Brockman, 34 Ky. 317. The contract in this case is an example
of those which are difficult to classify because the parties have not
clearly expressed their intention, for there is a well-defined legal
distinction between the contract of suretyship and that of guaranty. "The contract of the surety is a direct original agreement
with the obligee that the very thing contracted for shall be done.
The other (i. e., the guarantor) enters into a cumulative collateral engagement by which he agrees that-his principal is able
to and will perform. a contract which he has made or is about
to make and that if he fails he will, upon being notified thereof,
pay the resulting damages." La Rose et al. v. Logansport Nat.
Bank et al., 102 Ind. 332 (1885). See also Reigart v. White,
52 Pa. 438 (1866); Kearnes v. Montgomery, 4 W. Va. 29
(1870) ; Sugar Mfg. Co. v. Littler, 56 Ia. 601 (1881), and
Abbot v. .Brown, 131 Ill. 108 (1889). It is also well settled
that a surety, being from his contract practically identified
with his principal, is not entitled to notice of acceptance or
advances under his contract. A guarantor, however, is entitled
to notice: (1) Of acceptance, where his guaranty amounts to
a mere offer or proposal, and (2) of any advances made undef
it or defaults in payment made by his principal if his guaranty
be conditional, in order as said in Thompson v. Glover, 78 Ky.
193 (1878), "that the guarantor may' have an opportunity of
arranging his relations with the party for whose benefit or in
whose favor the guaranty is given," and it is added that "when
the whole of the transaction is connected and of such a nature
as to give the guarantor this information no specific or formal
notice is necessary." In support of this may be cited: Wright
v. Griffith, et al, 121 Ind. 478 (1889) ; Doud v. Bank, 54 Fed.
846 (1893) ; Davis v. Wells, 104 1U. S. 159 (1881) ; Powers v.
Bumcrat,-, 12"Oh. St. 273 (1861) ; Bishop v. Eaton, 161 Mass.
496 (1894) ; Bank v. Phelps, 86 N. Y. 484 (1881) ; Evans v.
McCormick, 167 Pa. 247 (1895) ; Crittenden v. Fiske, 46 Mich.
70 (1881).

